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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner-Appellant, Timothy A. Dunlap, who has been sentenced to death for the 
first-degree murder of Tonya Crane, appeals from the district court's Final Judgment 
granting the state's Motion for Summary Dismissal and dismissing the claims in his 
Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which is a successive petition stemming 
from his resentencing and the consolidated appeal therefrom. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
The facts leading to Dunlap's conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of 
death for Tonya's murder are summarized in Dunlap v. State (Dunlap III). 141 Idaho 50, 
55 106 P.3d 376 (2005) (footnote omitted), as follows: 
On October 16, 1991, Dunlap entered and robbed the Security 
State Bank in Soda Springs, Idaho. Dunlap entered the bank, stood within 
a few feet of bank teller Tonya Crane, and ordered her to give him all of 
her money. Without hesitation, Tonya Crane did so. Dunlap immediately 
and calmly pulled the trigger of his sawed-off shotgun, which was less 
than two feet from Tonya Crane's chest, literally blowing her out of her 
shoes. Police officers responded immediately. When the officers arrived 
at the bank, Tonya Crane had no pulse. When taken to the hospital she 
was pronounced dead on arrival. 
Dunlap fled the scene, but subsequently surrendered to police. 
After being given his Miranda rights, Dunlap confessed to the murder and 
to a murder that occurred ten days before in Ohio. The following day, 
Dunlap again confessed and explained how he planned and completed 
both murders. Dunlap was charged with first-degree murder and robbery. 
Within days of his arrest, Dunlap arranged to be interviewed by 
Marilyn Young, Associate Editor of the Albany New Tribune in Indiana. 
During the interviews Dunlap explained to Young how he murdered his 
girlfriend [Belinda Belanos] in Ohio with a crossbow and then traveled 
west where he subsequently planned to rob the Soda Springs' bank. 
Dunlap described the bank robbery and Tonya Crane's murder to the 
editor. 
I 
Dunlap was charged with Tonya's first-degree murder, robbery, and two 
sentencing enhancements for use of a firearm during the murder and robbery. State v. 
Dunlap (Dunlap I), 125 Idaho 530, 531, 873 P.2d 784 (1993). Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Dunlap pled guilty to Tonya's first-degree murder and use of a firearm in the 
commission of the murder, and the remaining charges were dismissed. Id. The district 
court subsequently sentenced Dunlap to death. Id. at 532. This Court affirmed Dunlap's 
conviction and death sentence. Id. at 539. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings Regarding Dunlap's Pre-Resentencing 
Petitions For Post-Conviction Relief 
Dunlap filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief that was dismissed because it 
was untimely. Dunlap v. State (Dunlap II), 131 Idaho 576, 576-77, 961 P.2d 1179 
(1998). Because Dunlap did not know and could not reasonably have known that a 
timely post-conviction petition was not filed before the appointment of new counsel, this 
Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 577. 
On remand, the state conceded error occurred during Dunlap's sentencing, 
requiring he be resentenced. Dunlap III, 141 Idaho at 56. Based upon the state's 
concession, the district court ordered a new sentencing hearing, but denied Dunlap's 
guilt-phase post-conviction claims after an evidentiary hearing. Id. This Court affirmed 
the district court's decision granting a new sentencing hearing and denying post-
conviction relief as to guilt. Id. at 66. 
Dunlap subsequently filed a pro se successive post-conviction petition raising 
claims this Court refused to address in Dunlap III because they were raised for the first 
time on appeal. Dunlap v. State (Dunlap IV), 146 Idaho 197,200, 192 P.3d 1021 (2008). 
2 
The district court summarily dismissed the claims because they were lqiown or 
reasonably could have been known when Dunlap filed the first post-conviction petition, 
and, alternatively, for failing to raise any genuine issues of material fact. Id. at 198, 200. 
This Court affirmed, concluding the claims were untimely and that Dunlap failed to 
establish "any genuine issue of material fact as to whether the claims were not known or 
could not have been known at the time his first petition was filed." Id. at 201. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings Regarding Resentencing And Post-
Conviction Petition 
Represented by new counsel David Parmenter and James Archibald, Dunlap's 
resentencing commenced in February 2006, and concluded with the jury finding three 
statutory aggravating factors and that the collective mitigation was not sufficiently 
compelling to make imposition of the death penalty unjust. State v. Dunlap (Dunlap V), 
155 Idaho 345,313 P.3d 1, 14 (2013). 1 The district court sentenced Dunlap to death. Id. 
Through the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD"), Dunlap filed his initial 
post-conviction petition. (#37270, R., pp.1-41.)2 The Final Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief contained thirty-seven claims with multiple sub-claims. (Id., pp.751-
1093.) The state filed an answer (id., pp.1190-1342) and Motion for Summary Dismissal 
(id., pp.1545-47), which the district court granted (id., pp.1940-2012). 
Dunlap filed timely notices of appeal, challenging his new death sentence and the 
denial of post-conviction relief; the appeals were consolidated pursuant to LC. § 19-
1 Dunlap's resentencing before a jury was mandated by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002), which requires a jury to determine whether the state has proven the statutory 
aggravating factors, and LC. § 19-2515(5), which was enacted as a result of Ring. 
2 Because of the multiple records and transcripts involved in this appeal, the state will 
refer to the records and transcripts by their respective supreme court numbers. 
3 
2719(6). Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 14. Dunlap's 114-page opening brief was lodged with 
this Court on February 25, 2011, and filed March 22, 2011. (#41105, R., pp.936-1049, 
1360.) On August 27, 2013, this Court affirmed Dunlap's death sentence, but concluded 
the district court erred by summarily dismissing two claims - ineffective assistance of 
counsel regarding the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence and rebuttal 
of the state's evidence in aggravation, and alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1962) - and remanded both claims 
for an evidentiary hearing; the summary dismissal of Dunlap's remaining post-conviction 
claims was affirmed. Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 48. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings In Dunlap's Successive Post-
Resentencing Post-Conviction Case 
With the assistance of new counsel, Dunlap filed his successive post-resentencing 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on April 7, 2011, raising nineteen claims containing 
both substantive and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims regarding jury 
instructions (Claims 1-6), voir dire (Claim 7), another Brady claim (Claim 8), disparity of 
resources (Claims 9, 10), the charging of statutory aggravators and the factual basis 
supporting those aggravators (Claims 11, 12), trial counsels' opening and closing 
statements (Claim 13), statutory challenges (Claim 14), written jury findings (Claim 15), 
Idaho's method of execution (Claim 16), Dunlap's competency at the time he pled guilty 
(Claim 17), victim impact statements (Claim 18), and denial of Dunlap's discovery 
request during the prior post-conviction proceeding (Claim 19). (#41105, R., pp.10-51.) 
The state filed an answer (id., pp.I 066-83) and Motion for Summary Dismissal asserting 
Dunlap's "substantive" claims should be summarily dismissed because he failed to 
4 
establish they were not known or could not reasonably have been known when he filed 
his first post-resentencing petition, were untimely, or otherwise fit within the narrow 
exception of LC. § 19-2719 (id., pp.1299-1304). As to his ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel claims, the state asserted Dunlap failed to overcome the presumption 
that the claims were not raised on appeal because of tactical decisions made by the 
SAPD, and that each claim otherwise failed on its merits. (Id., pp.1304-57). In his 
response, Dunlap conceded his "substantive claims may be barred in state court under § 
19-2719" but contended page limitations imposed by this Court during his consolidated 
resentencing appeal "constitute an external impediment to raising the claims and a due 
process violation under the federal Constitution" (id., pp. 13 87, 13 89-90); he also 
withdrew Claims 16 and 17 (id., pp.1447-48). 
Over the state's objection (id., pp.1535-49), Dunlap was permitted to amend his 
petition (id., pp.2177-78) recasting Claim 7 as ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
during voir dire and impaneling a biased jury. (Id., pp.1557-96.) On May 8, 2013, the 
district court granted the state's Motion for Summary Dismissal, concluding Dunlap's 
substantive claims could have been raised in his initial resentencing post-conviction 
petition. (Id., pp.2259-62.)3 While finding Dunlap's ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel claims were timely, the district court reasoned he failed to establish either 
deficient performance of appellate counsel or prejudice. (Id., pp.2267-2336.) Dunlap 
filed his Notice of Appeal June 10, 2013. (Id., pp.2340-43.) Final Judgment was filed 
June 24, 2013 (id., p.2352.) 
3 The district court's decision was signed May 8, 2013, but there is no filing stamp 
indicating when it was actually filed. 
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ISSUES 
Dunlap has phrased the issues on appeal as follows: 
A. Whether each underlying substantive claim that is the subject of 
each ineffective assistance on appeal claim may be considered on the 
merits? [sic] 
B. Whether Dunlap was denied federal constitutional rights when 
appellate counsel omitted violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause and Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and 
effective assistance of counsel, that (1) the resentencing court erroneously 
applied Witherspoon v. lllinois and improperly excluded a juror for cause; 
(2) the resentencing court failed to exclude numerous jurors who were 
substantially impaired under Morgan v. Illinois; and (3) trial counsel was 
ineffective, under Strickland v. Washington, in conducting voir dire 
resulting in a biased jury composed of substantially impaired jurors and an 
improper exclusion for cause of a qualified juror? [sic] 
C. Whether the preliminary jury instructions unconstitutionally 
restricted voir dire? [sic] 
D. Whether the propensity instruction given to the jury was vague and 
ambiguous under the Eighth Amendment and also resulted in a violation 
of The Due Process Clause? [sic] 
E. Whether the weighing instruction and verdict form lessened the 
State's burden of proof in violation of federal Ex-Post Facto and Due 
Process protections? [sic] 
(Brief, p.3.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
I. Has Dunlap waived his substantive claims because they were known or 
reasonably could have been known during his first resentencing post-conviction 
proceedings and subsequent appeal? 
2. Has Dunlap failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his voir dire 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims, thereby requiring their 
summary dismissal? 
3. Has Dunlap failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his three jury 
instruction ineffective assistance of appellate counsel sub-claims, thereby 




Dunlap's Substantive Claims Were Known At The Time He Filed His First Resentencing 
Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Dunlap contends, "In asserting claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel for not raising various issues, Dunlap also raised an underlying substantive issue 
for each appellate IAC claim." (Brief, p.6.) While Dunlap concedes his underlying 
substantive issues "could have been raised in the direct appeal, and that any failure to 
raise them therein may operate to waive the claims under§ 19-2719(5)," he contends the 
"only basis or excuse" he has for not previously raising them on appeal is that the SAPD 
"was limited on appeal by the page limits imposed by this Court," and that this Court's 
page limit for his resentencing consolidated appeal violated due process. (Id.) 
Dunlap has properly conceded his substantive claims were known or reasonably 
could have been known during his first resentencing post-conviction proceedings and 
appeal. Moreover, this Court's page limit for Dunlap's resentencing brief on appeal does 
not fall within the exception ofI.C. § 19-2719(5). To the extent Dunlap is raising a new 
due process claim associated with the Court's page limit, such a claim was never raised in 
Dunlap's successive amended petition and fails to meet the dictates of LC. § 19-2719. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a successive petition for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed 
pursuant to LC. § 19-2719 is a question oflaw, which this Court reviews de novo. Fields 
v. State, 154 Idaho 347,349,298 P.3d 241 (2013) (quotes and citation omitted). 
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C. Because Dunlap Has Failed To Comply With The Dictates Ofl.C. § 19-2719, The 
Substantive Claims In His Successive Petition Must Be Summarily Dismissed 
I. The Legal Parameters Ofl.C § 19-2719 
Idaho Code § 19-2719 sets forth special appellate and posh:onviction procedures 
in all capital cases. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-conviction 
proceedings which are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
("UPCP A"), are civil in nature and governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58 (1995). Idaho Code§ 19-2719 does 
not eliminate the applicability of the UPCP A in capital cases, but acts as a modifier and 
"supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions conflict." McKinney v. State, 
133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144 (1999); Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 470. 
Specifically, I.C. § 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to raise 
all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition which 
must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in I.C. § 19-2719(5), 
which permits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated 
that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within 
the time frame allowed by the statute." Id., 120 Idaho at 807. 
Additionally, claims which were not known or which could not have reasonably 
been known within forty-two days of judgment "must be asserted within a reasonable 
time after they are known or reasonably could have been known." Paz v. State, 123 
Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. In ascertaining 
what constitutes a "reasonable time," the Idaho Supreme Court explained: 
8 
[A] reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have 
known of the claim, unless petitioner shows that there were extraordinary 
circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that 
time period. In that event, it still must be filed within a reasonable time 
after the claim was known or knowable. 
Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,727,202 P.3d 642 (2008). 
Even if the petitioner can meet these mandates, LC. § 19-2719(5)(a) details the 
additional requirements that must be met before the successive petition may be heard: 
An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be 
heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that 
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be 
considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a 
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material 
facts stated under oath or affirmation by credible persons with first hand 
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that 
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or 
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed. 
LC.§ 19-2719(5)(a). 
A capital defendant who brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has 
a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that 
petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute." Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 
4 71. That burden includes establishing when the claim was known or reasonably could 
have been known. Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 41-42, 232 P.3d 813 (2010). If a capital 
petitioner fails to comply with the requir"ements of LC.§ 19-2719, the issues are "deemed 
to have [been] waived" and "[t]he courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any 
such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief." I. C. § 19-
2719( 5); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700. Likewise, failure to meet the requirements of LC. 
§ 19-2719(5)(a) mandates dismissal of the successive post-conviction petition. Fields v. 
State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-90, 17 P.3d 230 (2000). 
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2. Dunlap's Substantive Successive Post-Conviction Claims Are Governed 
By LC. § 19-2719 And Must Be Summarily Dismissed 
Each of Dunlap's substantive claims are waived under LC. § 19-2719 because 
they were known or reasonably could have been known during his initial resentencing 
post-conviction proceedings. His only "excuse" for "raising them in the successive 
petition in this case is that appellate counsel was limited on appeal by the page limits 
imposed by this Court." (Brief, p.6.) However, the only exception to LC. § 19-2719(5) 
is for "those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated that the issues raised were not 
known and reasonably could not have been known within the time frame allowed by the 
statute." Rhoades, 120 Idaho at 807. There is no exception based upon page limitations 
in a petition, appellate brief, or any other pleading. Based upon Dunlap's failure to 
establish a viable exception to LC. § 19-2719(5), his substantive claims are waived and 
were properly dismissed by the district court. 
Dunlap's attempt to raise a new due process claim based upon the page limitation 
also fails. First, Dunlap never raised such a claim in his amended petition. Rather, the 
claim was first raised as a "general argument common to all claims" in his Response to 
Motion for Summary Dismissal. (#41105, R., p.1389.) However, LC.§ 19-4903 requires 
the petition "specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based." As 
explained in Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 687, 978 P.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1999), "an 
applicant must file an amended application when he or she desires to raise additional 
issues in a post-conviction petition." Dunlap failed to follow this pleading requirement 
even when it was brought to his attention in the state's Reply Brief in Support of 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal (#41105, R., p.1498) and he was permitted 
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to amend his petition. He should not be permitted to raise a substantive due process 
claim on appeal when it was not properly pled in his amended petition. 
Second, the claim is untimely. While it could not have been raised during the 
initial post-conviction proceedings, it could have been raised no later than 42 days after 
this Court entered its Order on March 22, 2011. (#41105, R., p.1360.) "[A] reasonable 
time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief is forty-two days after the 
petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the claim." Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 
727. Dunlap has failed to argue there are "extraordinary circumstances that prevented 
him ... from filing the claim within that time period." Id. Although, Dunlap filed his 
successive petition on April 7, 2011, it did not contain a claim based upon the page 
limitation. Therefore, any constitutional claim regarding the page limitation is waived. 
Finally, even if considered on the merits, the claim fails. Not only has Dunlap 
failed to provide any authority establishing a page limitation violates due process, State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on 
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking."), several 
courts have expressly rejected such claims. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 
F.3d 293,301 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Being limited to a 20-page reply brief falls far short of the 
kind of due process violation that will permit a court to declare the judgment of another 
court void ab initio."); Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 271 ( 4th Cir. 1999) ("The fifty-
page limit merely limited the manner in which Weeks could present his arguments; it did 
not wholly prevent him from presenting them."); Watts v. Thompson, 116 F.3d 220, 224 
(ih Cir. 1997) ("Enforcing page limits and other restrictions on litigants is rather ordinary 
practice. This court has a page limit which is rather strictly, and cheerfully, enforced."). 
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Because Dunlap has failed to establish his substantive claims fit within the narrow 
exception of LC.§ 19-2719, they have been waived and the district court properly 
dismissed each since it had "no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been 
so waived or grant any such relief." LC.§ 19-2719(5); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700. 
II. 
Dunlap's Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel Claims Fail Because Of His 
Failure To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Regarding Deficient Performance 
And Prejudice 
A. Introduction 
Dunlap challenges the district court's dismissal of four of his ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claims, contending the issues he now raises with the 
assistance of new counsel are stronger than the claims raised with the assistance of the 
SAPD during his resentencing consolidated appeal. (Brief, pp.7-53.) Specifically, 
Dunlap challenges the dismissal of various sub-claims involving voir dire. (Brief, pp. 7-
43.) Dunlap next raises claims regarding three jury instructions. (Brief, pp.43-53.) 
Dunlap's claims fail because he has not established the SAPD's tactical decisions 
regarding claims in the consolidated appeal were objectively unreasonable, and because 
his new claims would not have prevailed on appeal, he has failed to establish prejudice. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) (quotes and 
citation omitted), this Court reaffirmed the standard of review in post-conviction cases in 
which summary dismissal was granted: 
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is 
properly granted, a court must review the facts in a light most favorable to 
the petitioner, and determine whether they would entitk petitioner to relief 
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C. 
if accepted as true. A court is required to accept the petitioner's 
unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's 
conclusions. The standard to be applied to a trial court's determination 
that no material issue of fact exists is the same type of determination as in 
a summary judgment proceeding. 
Standards Of Law Regarding Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel 
The unwavering standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims remains the 
test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which requires 
Dunlap establish both deficient performance and prejudice. The first element "requires a 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. In making this 
determination, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the 
"wide range of professional assistance." Id. at 689. Dunlap has the burden of showing 
counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. 
The effectiveness of counsel's performance must be evaluated from his perspective at the 
time of the alleged error, not with twenty-twenty hindsight. Id. at 689. "Unlike a later 
reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials 
outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the 
judge." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). "There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. 
Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same 
way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "The question is whether an attorney's .representation 
amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, not whether it deviated 
from best practices or most common custom." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
13 
The second element requires Dunlap to show "counsel's errors were so serious as 
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687. This requires Dunlap to demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome," id. at 694, which "requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a 
different result," Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (internal quotations 
and citation omitted). A reviewing court "must consider the totality of the evidence 
before the judge or jury," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, and in regards to sentencing must 
reweigh that evidence "against the totality of available mitigating evidence," Pinholster, 
131 S.Ct. at 1408 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)). 
The Strickland standard applies to appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 
387 (1985). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Dunlap 
must show his counsels' representation on appeal was deficient and that the deficiency 
was prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The relevant inquiry is whether there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, Dunlap would have prevailed on 
appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). While there is a constitutional right 
to effective appellate counsel, there is no obligation to raise every nonfrivolous issue. 
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, (1983). "Experienced advocates since time 
beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments 
on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." 
Id. Addressing the Strickland test, the Ninth Circuit has explained: 
These two prongs partially overlap when evaluating the performance of 
appellate counsel. In many instances appellate counsel will fail to raise an 
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issue because she foresees little or no likelihood of success on that issue; 
indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of 
the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy .... Appellate counsel will 
therefore frequently remain above an objective standard of competence 
(prong one) and have caused her client no prejudice (prong two) for the 
same reason - because she declined to raise a weak issue. 
Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). Based upon these standards, while it is still possible to raise ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claims, "it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was 
incompetent." Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288. 
These same general standards are utilized in Idaho to address ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claims. See Daniels v. State, 156 Idaho 327, ---, 325 P.3d 
668, 671-73 (Ct. App. 2014); Stevens v. State, 2013 WL 6423426, *9-11 (Ct. App. 
2013); Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2007). As explained 
in Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 164, 139 P.3d 762 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Yarborough v. 
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)), "When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of 
others, there is a strong presumption that he or she did so for tactical reasons rather than 
through sheer neglect." Strategic and tactical choices are "virtually unchallengeable" if 
made after thorough investigation of the law and facts. Strickland,.466 U.S. at 690-91. 
"Rare are the situations in which the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical 
decisions will be limited to any one technique or approach." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 789 
(quotations and citation omitted). Counsel is permitted to formulate a strategy that was 
reasonable at the time and "balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics 
and strategies." Id. As explained in United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 
1995), the issue not raised must be a "dead bang winner" that was "obvious from the trial 
record." See also Mintun, 144 Idaho at 45 (quoting Smith, 528 U.S. at 288 ("[O]nly 
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when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of 
effective assistance of counsel be overcome."). 
D. Counsels' Voir Dire And The Alleged Impartiality Of The Jury 
1. Introduction 
Dunlap contends the SAPD was ineffective on appeal for failing to raise trial 
counsels' alleged ineffectiveness during voir dire, which resulted in trial counsels' failure 
to object to Katherine McMinton being excused for cause, failing to object to eleven of 
the twelve jurors seated to hear Dunlap's resentencing which Dunlap contends violated 
due process under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and its progeny, and a 
general challenge to trial counsels' voir dire. (Brief, pp.7-53.) The majority of Dunlap's 
argument focuses upon the underlying merits of his claim and barely addresses whether 
the SAPD's performance was deficient. Because Dunlap has failed to overcome the 
presumption the SAPD winnowed out each of these sub-claims and failed to establish 
they would have changed the outcome of his appeal, each sub-claim fails. 
2. General Facts Regarding Jury Selection At The Resentencing 
At his resentencing, the district court denied Dunlap's motion for individual voir 
dire, but reconsidered and permitted the parties five minutes of individual voir dire. 
Dunlap V, 3313 P.3d at 20. Each venireman also completed a "comprehensive" 
questionnaire and general voir dire was permitted. Id. After voir dire, Parmenter 
believed the jury constituted "a fairly open-minded bunch." (#41105, R., p.389.) 
In his Final Amended Petition for·Post-Conviction Relief, Dunlap contended his 
trial attorneys were ineffective by failing to (1) retain a jury consultant, (2) object to the 
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jury questionnaire, (3) move for adequate voir dire procedures, (4) object to some of the 
prosecutor's statements in general voir dire, (5) oppose the motion to excuse McMinton 
for cause, (6) argue for excusing Craig Mansfield and Blair Mickelson for cause, (7) 
question the panel regarding "blood atonement," and (8) conduct an adequate individual 
voir dire that allegedly would have resulted in Chandis Lindsey, Corey Kunz, Kim 
Lindstrom, Matt Gronning, Kristine Robinson, Craig Crandall, James Young, Michelle 
Alver, Michael Nally, Hagen Beckstead, Eric Christensen, Lonnie Taggert, Cathy 
Canaday, Chad Neibaur, and Forest Hansen being excused for cause. (#32273, R., 
pp.787-823.) The district court rejected Dunlap's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, concluding trial counsels' voir dire decisions were tactical. (Id., pp.1951-54.) In 
his consolidated appeal, Dunlap contended the district court erred by limiting individual 
voir dire to five minutes and failing to excuse Mansfield and Mickelson for cause. 
(#41105, R., pp.953-58.) This Court reasoned Dunlap failed to establish the district court 
abused its discretion or committed reversible error. Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 19-20, 36-37. 
In his successive Amended Petition, Dunlap contended trial counsel failed to 
rehabilitate McMinton and that her exclusion violated Witherspoon. (#41105, R., 
p.1573.) Dunlap further contended trial counsel failed to properly voir dire eleven of the 
twelve jurors seated who allegedly were willing to automatically vote for the death 
penalty in violation of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). (Id., p.1574.) The 
district court rejected Dunlap's voir dire claims. (Id., pp.2287-2309.) 
3. Standards Of Law Regarding Witherspoon And Its Progeny 
In Witherspoon, 3 91 U.S. at 512, the Supreme Court examined a state statute that 
permitted the exclusion of jurors in death penalty cases who possessed only 
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"conscientious scruples against capital punishment." After recognizing "[a] man who 
opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary 
judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror," id. 
at 519, the Court held, "a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed 
or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they 
voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious 
scruples against its infliction," id. at 522 (footnote omitted). 
In Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 42 (1980), the Court examined whether a 
Witherspoon issue arose by asking veniremen about their ability to take an oath that 
included the phrase, "that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will 
not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact." Focusing upon the word, "affect," the 
Court explained: 
Such a test could, and did, exclude jurors who stated that they would be 
"affected" by the possibility of the death penalty, but who apparently 
meant only that the potentially lethal consequences of their decision would 
invest their deliberations with greater seriousness and gravity or would 
involve them emotionally. Others were excluded only because they were 
unable positively to state whether or not their deliberations would any way 
be "affected." But neither nervousness, emotional involvement, nor 
inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever is equivalent to 
unwillingness or an inability on the part of the jurors to follow the court's 
instruction and obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings about the 
death penalty. 
Id. at 49-50. The Court affirmed "the general proposition that a juror may not be 
challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views 
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror." Id. at 45. 
In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 418 (1985), after explaining "Witherspoon 
is best understood in the context of its facts," the Supreme Court recognized that "more 
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recent opinions of this Court demonstrate no ritualistic adherence to a requirement that a 
prospective juror make it 'unmistakably clear ... that [she] would automatically vote 
against the imposition of capital punishment," id. at 849. Reviewing Witherspoon and 
Adams, the Court took the "opportunity to clarify" Witherspoon, and reaffirm Adams "as 
the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause 
because of his or her views on capital punishment. That standard is whether the juror's 
views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with his instructions and his oath."' Wainwright at 852 (footnote omitted). 
The Court further explained, "this standard likewise does not require that a juror's bias be 
proved with 'unmistakable clarity"' "because determination of juror bias cannot be 
reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of 
catechism." Id. The Court recognized "there will be situations where the trial judge is 
left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and 
impartially apply the law. . .. [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who 
sees and hears the juror." Id. at 424-25. These principles have been applied by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 397-99, 807 P.2d 610 (1991), which 
recognized Wainwright "clarified" Witherspoon. 
In Morgan, 504 U.S. at 726, the Supreme Court examined the reverse of 
Witherspoon; that is, "whether the defendant is entitled to challenge for cause and have 
removed on the ground of bias, a prospective juror who will automatically vote for the 
death penalty irrespective of the facts or the trial court's instructions of law." Relying 
upon Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988), the Court answered affirmatively, 
concluding, "based upon the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any 
prospective juror who maintains such views." Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. 
4. The Exclusion OfMcMinton For Cause 
In her questionnaire, McMinton appeared ambivalent regarding the death penalty. 
(#41105, R., pp.2150-76.) For example, she had no opinion regarding her support of the 
death penalty, whether executions are needed to protect the public, whether it would be 
hard for her to vote to kill someone, whether televised executions would reduce crime, 
the wisdom of the death penalty, and leaving to God matters of life and death. (Id., 
pp.2163-65.) Nevertheless, when asked, "How do you feel about the death penalty," she 
responded, "When they are guilty of taking a life then they should be willing to give a 
life," and that she supported the death penalty. (Id., p.2166) (capitalization altered). 
Obviously concerned about McMinton's response that "they should be willing to 
give a life," Dunlap's counsel explored the area: 
Q. What do you mean by that? 
A. Well, you are going to play, you have got to pay. 
Q. That is similar to an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth? 
A. Yeah .... 
(Id., p.1809.) McMinton then changed the subject, resulting in the following colloquy: 
A. Yeah. I have a question, though, if I could really fast. In 
the big room, did you say he had mental problems? 
Q. That is going to be something that we are going to talk 
about. 
A. Well, on that fact I don't think I could give you a verdict 
of death. There is just no way. I know about mental illness and there is 
just no way. 
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Q. How do you know about mental illness? 
A. I have a stepsister. 
Q. What has she been diagnosed with? 
A. Paranoid schizophrenia. 
Q. If you hear evidence about Tim Dunlap having a mental 
illness, is that going to change your opinion on an eye for an eye? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is something that the Judge is going to tell you about, 
aggravating circumstances of the crime, mitigating circumstances of the 
crime, and you understand that sometimes there are explanations? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. It doesn't get him out of being guilty. 
A. Correct. 
Q. It just means what do we do with him. Do we give him the 
death penalty or do we let him stay in prison for the rest of his life. Is that 
what you are saying? 
A. That is what I am saying. 
Q. So when you answered this about an eye for an eye, you 
weren't thinking about mental illness? 
A. Correct. 
(Id., pp.1809-10) ( emphasis added). 
The prosecutor also questioned McMinton regarding her feelings surrounding 
mental illness and her ability to vote for the death penalty: 
Q. You talked a little bit about - it sounds like you have some 
pretty strong opinions on mental illness, and what that evidence might 
mean: is that fair to say? 
A. Yeah. 
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Q. If the facts and evidence in this case indicated that the 
death penalty was appropriate, and that being that the aggravating factors 
of this crime were not outweighed by any mitigation, would you refuse to 
give the death penalty just based on evidence that he might have had some 
mental problems? 
A. That is a hard one to answer. I am not sure. 
Q. I guess my question is, would you give more weight to the 
fact that there may be mental illness than you would the other evidence? 
A. On my past experience with my stepsister, I would have to 
say yeah. 
Q. So ifthere is evidence of any sort of mental problems, you 
could not give the death penalty? 
A. I could not. 
(Id., pp.1811-12) (emphasis added). The district court then granted the state's motion to 
disqualify McMinton for cause, concluding, "I do think that her present state of mind that 
if there is [sic] any mental problems she couldn't give the death sentence, I think that 
disqualifies her as a juror"; Dunlap's counsel did not object. · (Id., p.1812.) 
Apparently, Dunlap contends the SAPD should have raised this claim in his 
consolidated appeal since it was allegedly stronger than the issue raised regarding voir 
dire because that issue was allegedly "foreclosed by Ross v. Oklahoma" (Brief, p.22), and 
McMinton's answers indicated "she could follow the law with regard to sentencing 
determinations," was willing "to give death in some circumstances," and that she was 
merely willing to give mental health evidence "weight, great weight or even the ultimate 
weight in her decision making" (Brief, pp.19-20). 
Initially, Dunlap has failed to establish deficient performance. The SAPD raised a 
similar claim in the Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (#41105, R., 
pp.802-03.) Moreover, the SAPD raised a claim regarding the disqualification of two 
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other jurors for cause in the consolidated appeal. (Id., pp.956-58.) Based upon the 
claims raised during post-conviction proceedings and the appeal, the SAPD was 
obviously aware of the claim regarding McMinton, recognized it would be futile to 
challenge the district court's denial of the claim, and made a tactical decision to raise 
other claims that may have a greater chance of success on appeal. 
Dunlap attempts to refute this presumption by contending the claim raised on 
appeal by the SAPD "was foreclosed by Ross v. Oklahoma," making the instant claim 
"clearly a stronger issue." (Brief, p.22.) The state recognizes that in Mintun, 144 Idaho 
at 661, the Idaho Court of Appeals opined, "only when ignored issues are clearly stronger 
than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be 
overcome." However, this broad statement overstates the standards associated with 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. As explained in Dunlap V, 313 P Jd at 
40 (quotes and citation omitted), "When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, this Court does not second-guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such 
decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to 
have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review." The SAPD having raised the issue during the 
initial post-sentencing post-conviction proceedings and raising a similar issue on appeal 
demonstrates there was not "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective review." Rather, the SAPD made a tactical 
decision to raise other claims on appeal. 
Moreover, even the court of appeals has recognized more is required than merely 
finding weaker claims were raised on appeal. In Daniels, 325 P.3d at 672, the petitioner 
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contended appellate counsel was ineffective because the district court's denial of a 
suppression motion was a stronger appellate issue than the sentencing issue that was 
raised. Initially, the court of appeals opined the denial of the suppression motion was not 
"' clearly stronger' than the challenge to his sentence." Id. The court then recognized 
that while the standard of review for sentencing claims "makes it difficult to succeed on 
such a challenge, Idaho appellate courts have, on several occasions, granted sentencing 
relief." Id. at 673. The court further explained, "Moreover, we will not second-guess 
appellate counsel's strategic decision to pursue Daniels' excessive sentence challenge 
rather than to pursue an unsuccessful challenge to the suppression motion." Id. 
Merely because a weaker claim may have been raised on appeal, an argument the 
state does not concede, does not mean appellate counsel was ineffective. Such a test 
would result in a "weak" claim being filed in virtually every appeal just to leave open the 
possibility of an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in the future. 
Moreover, such a test ignores the fact that "[c]ounsel [are] permitted to develop a strategy 
that was reasonable at the time and may balance limited resources," Dunlap V, 313 P.3d 
at 40, and counsel have "no constitutional obligation to raise every nonfrivolous issue 
requested by an appellant," Daniels, 325 P.3d at 671 (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751). 
Additionally, because Dunlap's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim 
involves an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the appellate counsel claim is 
wrapped in a double presumption, which is exceptionally difficult to penetrate. Bryan v. 
State, 794 N.E.2d 1135, 1142 (Ind. App. 2003). "This is no mere quibble. Appellate 
lawyers must make difficult judgment calls in narrowing a broad range of possible claims 
to a select few that are thought to have the best chance of success. In this winnowing 
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process, possibly valid claims may be eliminated due to page limits, time limits on oral 
argument, or the strategic judgment that the perceived strongest contentions not be 
diluted." Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1221 (Ind. 1998). Because Dunlap failed to 
rebut the presumptions associated with this claim, it was properly dismissed. 
Dunlap has also failed to establish Strickland prejudice. Not only was McMinton 
properly excused for cause under Wainwright and Enno, she was properly excused under 
Witherspoon. Her statement, "there is just no way" (#41105, R., p.1810) establishes her 
unequivocal decision that, if any mental health evidence was presented, she could not 
impose the death penalty. Indeed, when asked by the prosecutor, "if there is evidence of 
any sort of mental problems" could she vote for the death penalty, McMinton replied, "I 
could not." (Id., p.1812) (emphasis added). Moreover, the manner in which the issue 
was raised supports the district court's decision; it was McMinton that raised the issue by 
interrupting Dunlap's attorney and changing the subject from questioning regarding her 
feelings about the death penalty to mental illness, which she knew about because her 
sister had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. (Id., pp.1809-10.) Indeed, 
despite her opinion about the death penalty, when asked whether it would change her 
opinion "on an eye for an eye," McMinton responded, "Yes." (Id., p.1810.) This was 
clearly more than a juror who was willing to give great consideration to mitigation 
evidence, but was a juror who unequivocally stated she would not impose the death 
penalty because she "[knew] about mental illness and there is just no way." (Id., p.1810.) 
Based upon such unequivocal responses and the time limits imposed by the 
district court, exactly how trial counsel was supposed to "rehabilitate" McMinton remains 
a mystery. While she expressed a willingness to follow the law (id., p.1811 ), her 
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response was certainly not as definitive as her responses regarding mental illness and not 
being willing to vote for the death penalty. Irrespective, the standard "does not require 
that a juror's bias be proved with 'unmistakable clarity."' Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424; 
see also Enno, 119 Idaho at 398. More importantly, the district court was in the position 
to examine McMinton's demeanor and credibility, which "are peculiarly within a trial 
judge's province." Wainwright at 428. This is particularly important in this case because 
of the manner in which the issue was raised by McMinton and the close ties she had with 
mental illness because of her sister's diagnosis. As recognized by the Supreme Court, 
"'the manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real 
character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but cannot always be spread 
upon the record. Care should, therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to reverse 
the ruling below upon such a question of fact, except in a clear case."' Id. at 428 n.9 
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1989)). 
The SAPD was not required to tackle the voir dire issues with a shotgun approach 
on appeal as initially advocated in Dunlap's first post-conviction case and now advocated 
in his successive post-conviction proceedings. Rather the SAPD chose a strategy 
surgically attacking the voir dire process by limiting the claims on appeal. More 
importantly, because this claim would not have changed the outcome of Dunlap's appeal, 
it also fails under Strickland's prejudice prong. 
5. Counsels' Decision To Not Object To The Exclusion Of Eleven Jurors 
The remainder of Dunlap's challenge to the SAPD's performance on appeal 
surrounds trial counsels' decisions to not object to eleven of the twelve jurors on his jury. 
(Brief, pp.24-43.) As to whether the SAPD's performance was deficient, the only 
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argument Dunlap raises is that the claims raised by the SAPD regarding voir dire were 
"clearly weaker." (Brief, p.25.) However, as previously discussed, merely because an 
allegedly weaker claim is raised on appeal does not mean the SAPD's performance was 
deficient. Dunlap has failed to establish the SAPD's failure to raise these sub-claims was 
the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective review. Rather, the claims .were winnowed out and the SAPD 
presumptively made tactical decisions to raise other claims on appeal. 
Additionally, it must be remembered the claims Dunlap is raising involves the 
SAPD's failure to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for alleged 
inadequacies during voir dire and failing to move for removal of jurors for cause. In 
other words, not only must Dunlap establish the SAPD's decision was objectively 
unreasonable, he must also establish that trial counsels' decisions to not move for 
exclusion of the jurors was objectively unreasonable. For example, in her questionnaire, 
Canady agreed "that the burden of proof should be greater than beyond a reasonable 
doubt, such as proof beyond any possible doubt or proof to an absolute certainty," and 
then explained, "I feel you should be sure through the evidence that he or she did the 
crime without doubt." (#41105, R., p.2074.) Trial counsel would have wanted to retain a 
juror who expressed an exceptionally strong desire to have the state prove the elements 
required for imposition of the death penalty. Canaday also explained that as a result of 
watching television and movies, she had "become more desincitized [sic] over the years." 
(Id., p.2078.) Considering the brutality with which Dunlap murdered Tonya, this was a 
plus for the defense. Canaday also agreed that "[i]nnocent people have been executed." 
(Id., p.2080.) Answering the question regarding statements that most accurately 
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represented how she felt about the death penalty, Canady chose the middle ground, 
agreeing, "I generally favor the death penalty, but I would base a decision to impose it on 
the facts and the law in the case." (Id., p.2084.) Based upon these answers, it was 
reasonable for trial counsel to not object to Canady sitting on Dunlap's jury. Moreover, 
because there was no basis for excusing Canady for cause, it was also reasonable for trial 
counsel to not seek her recusal, and for the SAPD to winnow the claim on appeal. 
Dunlap has also failed to establish prejudice, and his arguments demonstrate a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Morgan by asserting an overly-broad basis for 
exclusion. As confirmed by the Ninth Circuit, "A defendant has a constitutional due 
process right to remove for cause a juror who will automatically vote for the death 
penalty." United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 954 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Morgan, 
supra) ( emphasis added). In Mitchell, although the juror responded to a question 
"indicat[ing] that she thought the only punishment for certain kinds of 'horrific crimes 
should be death,' she later qualified that response by indicating, 'well, death or 
imprisonment.' Thereafter she said in a number of ways that she could keep an open 
mind." 502 F.3d at 955. The Ninth Circuit was clearly examining the entirety of the 
juror's responses and not focusing exclusively upon her response to a single question. 
Similarly, in Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 438 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729), the Sixth Circuit recognized cause could be established only if 
the juror "'will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case"' because such 
jurors '"will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances as the instructions require."' Although a juror initially stated she thought 
anyone guilty of murder should not be "up and walking around," her other responses 
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indicated "she did not believe that everyone who purposely murdered should be 
sentenced to death." Id. As a result of the totality of the juror's statements, the court 
concluded, "These statements suggest that [the juror] would not 'automatically vote for 
the death penalty in every case,' and demonstrate that she could take into consideration 
mitigating factors." Id. at 438-39. 
Moreover, a juror's equivocal answers regarding imposition of the death penalty 
do not establish a vote for "automatic" imposition of the death penalty. In Bowling v. 
Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 520 (6th Cir. 2003), the court discussed some of the jurors' answers 
which were equivocal, and concluded, "Though we recognize this is a close question, 
ultimately Livingston is not an 'automatic death penalty' juror within the meaning of 
Morgan. Livingston did initially state that he would automatically give the death penalty 
to those who met the aggravating factor, but later he expressly said that he would 
consider mitigating evidence." See also Bartee v. Quarterman, 574 F.Supp.2d 624, 667 
(W.D. Tex. 2008) ("Ms. Jones' ambiguous and vacillating answers regarding her 
personal opinion on the applicability of the death penalty did not establish she was 
unwilling or unable to consider all relevant mitigating evidence in answering the capital 
sentencing special issues."). As explained in Patton v. Young, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038-39 
(1984), when jurors' answers are ambiguous and contradictory, "it is [the] judge who is 
best situated to determine competency to serve impartially. The trial judge properly may 
choose to believe those statements that were the most fully articulated or that appeared to 
have been least influenced by leading [questions]." This determination "is essentially 
one of credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor." Id. at 1039. 
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Relying primarily upon her questionnaire, Dunlap contends Canaday "is the most 
obvious[ ] ADP juror who sat on [his] jury."4 (Brief, pp.25-27.) However, while 
Canady's questionnaire indicated she believed in the death penalty, which was reaffirmed 
during voir dire when she stated, "I believe in the death penalty," when asked, "[h]ow do 
you feel about being the one that has to make that decision," she responded, "That is a 
[sic] difficult because I have not had to live that out, you know, my beliefs before. So 
that is not the easiest you know." (#41105, R., p.1791.) Moreover, irrespective of her 
"personal feelings about the death penalty," Canaday recognized she had "to be fair too, 
and I believe I can when I [think] it through." (Id., p.1792.) Additionally, when asked 
about her consideration of mitigation evidence,· Canaday explained "it won't be the 
easiest case. This is my first case," but agreed she "could give [Dunlap] due benefit by 
listening to the evidence" and explaining, "I believe so, yes, because, like I said, I felt a 
lot the last two days trying to figure it out." (Id., p.1795.) 
Canaday' s responses do not establish she would automatically impose the death 
penalty. Jurors are not excluded based upon their "beliefs" regarding the death penalty. 
As explained in Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519, "A man who opposes the death penalty, 
no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by 
the state and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror." Just like "general objections" to 
the death penalty cannot exclude a venireman from jury service, general statements of 
support for the death penalty cannot exclude a venireman from jury service. 
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 ("veniremen cannot be excluded for cause on the 
ground that they hold such views"). As further explained by the Supreme Court, "The 
4 Dunlap uses the abbreviation "ADP" to refer to jurors he believes would automatically 
impose the death penalty or be unable to give effect to mitigating evidence. (Brief, p.24.) 
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most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider 
all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, 
before the trial has begun, to vote [for or] against the penalty of death regardless of the 
facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceeding." Id. 
Canaday and the other jurors fall within this category; they were all willing to 
consider imposition of the death penalty and fixed life without the possibility of parole. 
Not a single juror expressed the view that they would "automatically vote for the death 
penalty in every case" or otherwise "fail in good faith to consider the evidence of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require[d]." Morgan, 504 
U.S. at 728. Dunlap has failed in his quest to establish the SAPD's performance was 
deficient for failing to raise these new claims because he has failed to pierce the 
presumption that the decision not to raise these claims was tactical and that the SAPD 
winnowed out these ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. Dunlap has also failed 
to establish prejudice because none of the claims are "dead-bang" winners on appeal. See 
Cook, 45 F.3d at 395. Even under Mintun, 144 Idaho at 66, Dunlap has failed to 
establish the Morgan claims "are clearly stronger than those presented." 
Focusing upon snippets from Crandall's questionnaire, Dunlap next challenges 
the SAPD's tactical decision to not appeal trial counsels' alleged ineffectiveness to move 
to excuse Crandall for cause. (Brief, pp.28-29.) While Dunlap focuses upon some of 
Crandall's answers, he ignores others. Crandall disagreed with the statements, "Murder 
is murder, and understanding motives and circumstances is not important," "I do not 
believe criminals can be rehabilitated," "[a] person would not be brought to trial unless 
the person was guilty," [i]t doesn't matter what kind of childhood a murderer had," and 
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[c]ourts are too concerned with the rights of criminals." (#41105, R., pp.1939-40.) He 
also agreed with the statement, "It is possible for even the worst criminal to turn his or 
her life around." (Id., p.1940.) Even his support for the death penalty was not "strong"; 
he merely agreed when asked whether he supported the use of the death penalty. (Id.) 
Admittedly, in the questionnaire Crandall stated, "if a person commits a crime that is 
punishable by the death penalty- so be it." (Id., p.1942.) When asked during voir dire to 
explain his answer he initially stated, "I would just think that if the crime fits the 
punishment, then that is how it ought to be," and when asked how he would determine 
"whether the crime fits the punishment," explained, "I suppose that is what we are doing 
here. We are going to have to determine that." (Id., pp.1762-63.) This response does not 
indicate Crandall would automatically impose the death penalty in every case; quite the 
contrary, he recognized he would have to hear all the evidence and base his decision upon 
the evidence presented in court. Crandall also agreed that "life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole" "is always a reasonable option for a jury," and that any juror could 
hold out for life imprisonment as opposed to the death penalty. (Id., pp.1763-64.) Trial 
counsel was not deficient in passing Crandall for cause and the SAPD was not deficient 
for winnowing out this claim and tactically deciding to raise other issues on appeal. 
Because Crandall was not a juror who would automatically vote for the death penalty, 
Dunlap's Morgan claim fails resulting in his failure to establish prejudice as an 
ineffective assistance of resentencing claim and, therefore, an appellate counsel claim. 
Focusing upon answers to only two questions from the questionnaire, Dunlap next 
contends Taggart was "Morgan impaired." (Brief, p.29.) Taggart's answers to other 
questions indicate he would be a good defense juror. For example, he disagreed that 
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"[m]urder is murder, and understanding motives and circumstances is not important," that 
"[p]eople who kill should be punished no matter what the circumstances are," and that 
criminals cannot be rehabilitated. (#41105, R., pp.2135-37.) He also agreed 
"[p]sychologists can tell you lot about a person," "[w]e should always try to see the best 
in people," and that he would be "uncomfortable about having to decide about executing 
someone." (Id., p.2137.) More importantly, he explained the death penalty is warranted 
only "in some cases." (Id., p.2138.) "Some" is not an "automatic vote for the death 
penalty in every case," as required under Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728. Taggart also believed 
he was the type of person that could conduct the weighing process in a death penalty 
case. (Id., p.1805.) Indeed, even though he was a school trustee, Taggart was not 
concerned he would be voted out of office if he voted for life in prison without parole. 
(Id., pp.1806-07.) When asked about his questionnaire response regarding death penalty 
appeals, Taggart explained, "It should have been carried out or sentenced to life in 
prison." (Id., p.1807) ( emphasis added). He further agreed he had not made up his mind 
whether Dunlap "should get the death penalty or life in prison without parole" and that 
"there might be a situation that would be unjust to give the death penalty." (Id.) 
Taggart's collective answers establish Dunlap's claim fails. 
Dunlap contends Kunz was "predisposed on the propensity aggravating 
circumstance and was an ADP juror." (Brief, p.30.) As detailed above, this is not the test 
that requires recusal for cause under Morgan. Kunz described an "unpleasant experience 
involving law enforcement" stemming from his arrest for disturbing the peace (#41105, 
R., p.2020), a factor that favored the defense. He disagreed that "[m]urder is murder, and 
understanding motives and circumstances is not important," that criminals cannot be 
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rehabilitated, that "[p]sychiatrists and psychologists rarely provide any real help to people 
with problems," "[n]o one convicted of murder should ever be allowed out of prison," 
and "[i]t doesn't matter what kind of childhood a murderer had." (Id., pp.2023-24.) He 
agreed "[i]t is possible for even the worst criminal to turn his or life around" and "[i]t 
would be hard for me to vote to kill someone," and strongly agreed "criminals should be 
rehabilitated whenever possible" and was "uncomfortable about having to decide about 
executing someone." (Id., p.2025.) While Kunz believed there "are circumstances under 
which the death penalty could be an appropriate penalty," he recognized it "[m]ust be 
decide[d] on a case-by-case basis." (Id., pp.2026-27.) When asked about his ability to 
"go into this situation with an open mind and do the weighing that is required," Kunz 
discussed the thought process he had already undertaken and "how difficult it might be to 
come to that kind of decision," explaining, "I think the only way that I could come to that 
decision would be to look at all of the evidence and listen to the instructions accordingly 
that explains what the law is, and the only way I could live with it is to look at all of that 
stuff and weigh it in my own mind and come to a decision for myself, what needs to be 
done." (Id., pp.1778-79.) Kunz recognized the necessity of considering mitigation, 
including how Dunlap was raised, and agreed he would need to be instructed by the 
district court prior to deliberating. (Id., pp.1780-81.) This is not a juror who would 
automatically vote for the death penalty irrespective of the facts or the instructions of 
law, but is a juror who was willing to examine all of the evidence before determining 
whether the death penalty should be imposed. 
Dunlap next challenges Gronning. (Brief, pp.31-32.) In his questionnaire, 
Gronning responded to a question regarding how he felt about the death penalty, stating, 
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"In some cases it is fair and warranted." (#41105, R., p.1886.) When questioned during 
voir dire regarding his response, Gronning explained, "Well, basically I think you take it 
case by case. In my opinion, you know, if someone has thought it out, planned it, and 
they execute it the way they had it planned, I think it is different than something of a 
spur-of-the-moment type thing. That is kind of what I mean by that." (Id., p.1748.) 
Dunlap contends, "Gronning's answer is another case of a juror believing that the 
circumstances where death is not appropriate are limited to instances of a lesser degree of 
murder, a non-deliberate, non-premeditated murder that would not even be eligible for 
the death penalty." (Brief, p.31.) Dunlap is mistaken because Gronning never stated he 
would limit his decision to impose a fixed life sentence to cases involving less than first-
degree murder, but stated it must be considered "case by case." Dunlap's argument is 
particularly disingenuous since the jury had not even been instructed regarding what 
constitutes mitigation and how it must be weighed against the individual aggravating 
factors. 5 While Gronning was never questioned regarding his view of mitigation, he 
agreed to follow the jury instructions even if he disagreed with the law as instructed by 
the district court (#41105, R., p.1883), and said he would base his decision on the facts 
and law in the case (id., p.1888). When asked ifhe had already decided whether Dunlap 
"should get life imprisonment without parole, or the death penalty," Gronning responded, 
5 Dunlap makes a similar argument with regard to several other jurors and their answer to 
the question, "It doesn't matter what kind of childhood a murderer had." (Brief, pp.32-
35.) Without the jury having been instructed on what constitutes mitigation, Dunlap's 
claim that the jurors' answer to this single question disqualifies them under Morgan, is 
preposterous, demonstrating why trial counsel declined to move for the jurors' 
disqual_ification and the SAPD chose not to raise the issue on appeal. The same analysis 
applies to Dunlap's argument regarding some jurors' answer to the question, "Someone 
already convicted of a murder is likely to kill someone else." (Brief, p.35.) This question 
alone, without being instructed on the definition of mitigation, does not establish a juror 
will automatically vote for the death penalty or not consider mitigation evidence. 
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"No," and explained there are cases where the death penalty would not be appropriate. 
(Id., pp.1748-49.) After disclosing that he knew the son of Richard Hunsaker, Gronning 
agreed he would not feel "any pressure at all to vote one way or another for either the 
death penalty or the [sic] life imprisonment without parole," and did not have any bias for 
or against either side." (Id., pp.1751-52.) Because Dunlap has failed to establish 
Gronning was a juror that would automatically vote for the death penalty in every case, 
trial counsel was not ineffective by declining to seek the exclusion Gronning for cause 
and the SAPD was not ineffective for failing to raise this dubious claim on appeal. 
Dunlap also challenges Nally. (Brief, p.33.) While many of Nally's answers 
indicated support for the death penalty, other answers indicated his willingness to 
consider the evidence presented and that he was not an automatic vote for the death 
penalty. For example, while Nally "generally favor[ed] the death penalty," he agreed to 
"base a decision to impose it on the facts and law in the case." (#41105, R., p.2056.) He 
also agreed, "It is better for society to let some guilty people go free than to risk 
convicting an innocent man," "[p ]sychologists can tell you a lot about a person," "[i]t is 
possible for even the worst criminal to turn his or her life around," "criminals should be 
rehabilitated whenever possible," "[w]e should always try to see the best in people," and 
he was "uncomfortable about having to decide about executing someone." (Id., pp.2052-
53.) When questioned whether he had "any reservations" about being able to vote for the 
death penalty based upon the evidence and the law, he responded, "No, sir," and when 
asked, "are you willing to vote against it if the evidence doesn't show that," he 
responded, "I think I am fairly objective, sir, yes, in mind." (Id., pp.1783-84.) Nally 
further agreed he could "give both the State and the defense a fair shake in this case." 
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(Id.) The weighing process was also discussed and Nally agreed that was something he 
could "do fairly and justly," and he agreed "that given the proper mitigating evidence that 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is always a reasonable alternative for a 
juror." (Id., pp.1787-88.) Based upon the colloquy with Nally, Dunlap has failed to 
establish the SAPD was ineffective on appeal because trial counsel was not ineffective by 
declining to move for his exclusion for cause. Indeed, his agreeing that life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole is "always a reasonable alternative" made him a good 
defense juror. Dunlap's arguments to the contrary overstate the holding of Morgan. 
Dunlap's argument regarding Beckstead is premised upon a single question from 
the questionnaire regarding the childhood of a murderer (Brief, pp.33-34) that the state 
has addressed above. The answer to that question does not make him "Morgan 
impaired," let alone establish a viable ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. 
In fact, when he was questioned regarding his feelings about the death penalty, Beckstead 
responded, "I am okay with the death penalty, but I think it needs to be [ used] pretty 
cautiously. I mean, it is kind of an important decision." (#41105, R., p.1798.) This 
statement alone establishes Beckstead was not a juror who would automatically impose 
the death penalty in every case or ignore mitigation evidence. However, Beckstead 
continued by agreeing that, "if the law and the facts do not require [the death penalty, he] 
could vote the other way." (Id., p.199.) 
The same is true with respect to Lindsay, Robinson, Christensen, and Lindstrom 
who Dunlap next challenges (Brief, pp.34-35); each responded in a similar fashion to the 
same "childhood question" or the alleged "propensity question." The answers to those 
two questions do not make them "Morgan impaired," let alone establish a viable 
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ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. Lindsay was questioned regarding the 
"right circumstances" for imposing the death penalty and responded, "you would just 
have to weigh out all of the evidence. If the crime fights [sic] for that penalty, that is 
what you should hand down, after weighing out all of the evidence." (#41105, R., 
p.1737.) Lindsay was comfortable "listening to the mitigating and the aggravating 
evidence and kind of weighing it all out in [her] mind" as well as the state having the 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id.) Moreover, she disagreed with the 
premise that "[l]ife in prison without the possibility of parole is not a harsh enough 
penalty for murder" (id., p.1829) and explained the death penalty "is appropriate in some 
cases. It is not appropriate for all cases. You must decide on a case by case basis" (Id., 
p.1831 ). This is not a juror who would automatically vote for the death penalty 
irrespective of the facts or the trial court's instructions. 
In her questionnaire, Robinson stated, "I support the death penalty. I feel those 
who commit terrible murders and are a threat to society should be put to death." (Id., 
p.1914.) During voir dire, she agreed that was still her opinion, but when asked how she 
would determine "what a terrible murder is," she responded, "Well, see, I don't know 
what the State uses as their - I assume the Judge would provide us with some guidelines, 
and I don't know what those guidelines are." (Id., pp.1757-58.) In determining what 
constitutes a "threat to society," Robinson agreed "that probably depends on the evidence 
and what comes out." (Id., p.1758.) Discussing the "weighing process," Robinson 
acknowledged she could "go through that weighing process and do it fairly and justly" 
and "that given the proper mitigation, that life imprisonment is always a reasonable 
option in this kind of case." (Id., p.1758.) Trial counsel were not ineffective because no 
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Morgan violation occurred as a result of Robinson being seated on the jury and the SAPD 
was not ineffective in failing to raise such a claim on appeal. 
Christensen also agreed he would listen to testimony from psychologists and 
psychiatrists "with an open mind." (Id., p.1772.) When asked what he thought about 
Dunlap "get[ting] the death penalty," Christensen responded: 
I think, you know, we have been asked if we are chosen to look at 
the circumstances and go above what our personal things are and provide 
what the law instructs you to do and keep that out of it. That is very 
important cause [sic] that is what our society is based on, to be able to take 
ourselves out of it. Yeah, it is easy to have blases [sic] sometimes but I 
think we need to be honest with ourselves in the purpose because I think it 
is a very serious question. 
(Id., p.1772.) On his questionnaire, Christiansen also explained the death penalty "has a 
place but you need to use it with caution and only when warranted." (Id., p.1998.) 
( capitalization altered). Based upon the response to the questionnaire and the entirety of 
the voir dire, Christensen was not a juror who was remotely inclined to impose the death 
penalty in every case or ignore relevant mitigation evidence. It is little wonder the SAPD 
chose not to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim based upon Morgan. 
Dunlap's arguments regarding Lindstrom are also without merit. The only 
argument he makes involves the alleged "propensity question" (Brief, p.35), which the 
state has addressed. Moreover, Lindstrom's questionnaire and voir dire establish he was 
not an automatic vote for the death penalty nor would he ignore relevant mitigation. 
Lindstrom disagreed that "[m]urder is murder, and understanding motives and 
circumstances is not important," "[n]o one convicted of murder should ever be allowed 
out of prison," and strongly agreed that "criminals should be rehabilitated whenever 
possible." (#41105, R., pp.1856-68.) Additionally, Lindstrom had served on a jury tried 
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by Archibald just the summer before and Archibald may have felt a connection with 
Lindstrom as a result of that trial. (Id., pp.1740-42.) When questioned regarding her 
questionnaire statement that she "feel[s] if a person has no remorse or doesn't show any 
sign of being able to be rehabilitated, the death penalty is justified" (id., p.1859), 
Lindstrom explained, "I guess it depends on probably what lead [sic] up to killing 
someone in the first place, and are they glad they did it. Do they not care that they took a 
life. I guess even their own views on whether they would rather spend time [sic] the rest 
of their life in prison or have the death penalty themselves. I mean, a lots [sic] of factors 
go into that, plus the law. You know, what are the legal issues as far as recommendations 
for either one" (id., p.1744). When asked, "So in your mind, being guilty of murder does 
not automatically mean the death penalty," Lindstrom replied, "Well, there are moral 
issues and then there are legal issues that go along with it too." (Id.) Lindstrom's 
responses do not establish she was a juror willing to automatically vote for the death 
penalty, but wanted to hear the facts and apply those facts to the law as given by the 
district court. Dunlap's claim regarding Lindstrom was properly dismissed. 
6. Dunlap's General Challenge To Trial Counsels' Voir Dire 
In what is a repetitive, perplexing, and confusing argument, Dunlap makes a 
general challenge to trial counsels' voir dire (Brief, pp.36-43), challenging the questions 
asked, counsels' failure to move for exclusion of the jurors discussed in the previous 
section, and their failure to "rehabilitate [ ] McMinton and oppose the State's motion to 
exclude her for cause" (id., p.37). While the state will attempt to address Dunlap's 
general challenge to counsels' voir dire, the arguments regarding McMinton's exclusion 
and the eleven jurors who were not excused has been addressed in the two prior sections. 
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"The choice of questions to ask prospective jurors during voir dire is largely a 
matter of trial tactics. Such strategic or tactical decisions made by trial counsel will not 
be second-guessed on post-conviction relief, unless those decisions are made upon the 
basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation." Milton v. State, 126 Idaho 638,641,888 P.2d 812 (Ct. 
App. 1995); see also State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 793, 948 P.2d 127 (1997) (counsel's 
decision that challenges were unnecessary will not be questioned on appeal). 
Based particularly upon the district court's rulings limiting voir dire, the alleged 
deficiencies by trial counsel were nothing more than trial tactics. As explained by 
Parmenter, "It's a little hard in five minutes to delve into every issue. So typically you 
kind of have to highlight the areas where -- that you thought it might be most effective 
and decide whether that is the kind of jury that you want or not." (#41105, R., p.394.) 
Archibald agreed, "voir dire changes from trial to trial for respective jurors or for 
respective attorneys" (id., p.600) and "knowing that you had the five-minute time limit, 
we would pick our couple of top issues ... we tried to use our five minutes very, very 
frugally. Very efficiently" (id., p.601). Dunlap also ignores the importance of a 
prospective juror's "body language," "one of the factors that you consider," and was 
considered by counsel. (Id., p.607.) Dunlap has also failed to establish additional voir 
dire would have resulted in any additional jurors' recusal for cause because, as explained 
by Parmenter, he "can't tell you what results that would have created." (Id., p.429.) 
While Dunlap concedes "the resentencing court's [allegedly] unreasonable 
temporal limitation is certainly responsible in part for the truncated individual 
questioning," he contends the court's "limits cannot excuse trial counsel's [sic] failure to 
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explore issues presented in the jury questionnaire responses of jurors who ultimately were 
seated on [his] jury," complaining about questions regarding "irrelevant matters." (Brief, 
p.38.) However, Dunlap's claims regarding "irrelevant matters" are both conclusory, 
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560-61, 199 P.3d 123 (2008), and generally not supported 
with any facts or citation to the record and, therefore, must be disregarded by this Court. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. Irrespective, considering the fact that Dunlap's mental health 
"was the primary focus of the defense at sentencing," Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 45-46, his 
complaint regarding voir dire questions regarding Canaday' s background in psychology 
and whether she would consider such evidence rings hollow and illustrates the 
overzealous nature of Dunlap's current claims. The old proverb, "one man's junk is 
another man's treasure," rings particularly true regarding the questioning of prospective 
jurors when trial lawyers, in very short periods of time, attempt to develop a relationship 
with individuals that will decide their clients' fates. 
Dunlap's reliance upon Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 632-33 (Mo 2002) (en 
bane), is sorely misplaced. The court's finding of deficient performance was based on 
counsel's complete failure to read the two jurors' questionnaires prior to voir dire, which 
resulted in failing to learn of Morgan issues that should have been raised during voir dire. 
In other words, it was based upon "inadequate preparation," something "capable of 
objective review," Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 40, which does not exist in Dunlap's case. 
Dunlap's reliance upon Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 40-41 (Mo 2006), is 
also misplaced. The Missouri Supreme Court's decision that trial counsel's failure to 
excuse a juror was ineffective was based upon statements made during voir dire that the 
juror was unwilling to follow the law when he stated his requirement that the defendant 
42 
present evidence establishing he should not be given the death penalty. Id. at 40. The 
court explained, "No competent defense attorney would intentionally leave someone on 
the jury who indicated a strong preference for the death penalty and also stated that he 
would require the defense to convince him that death was not appropriate even though he 
was aware that the burden of proof remains with the state." Id. at 41 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the court explained part of its decision was also based upon the fact that 
Anderson's attorneys both testified they failed to excuse the juror because of an 
"oversight" resulting from "a note-taking error." Anderson is clearly inapposite because 
none of Dunlap's jurors indicated a refusal to follow the law nor is there any evidence 
establishing his attorneys inadvertently left a juror on that should have been excused. In 
fact, Parmenter discussed his thoughts regarding the jury and testified he thought they 
"were working with, you know, a fairly open-minded bunch." (#41105, R., p.389.) 
Because Dunlap has failed to establish trial counsel were ineffective, his appellate 
counsel claim fails, not only because it is not "obvious from the record" the claim would 
succeed on appeal, but the SAPD made tactical decisions to raise more viable claims than 
the voir dire claims Dunlap presented in his successive petition and now on appeal. 
E. SAPD's Failure To Appeal Jury Instructions 
1. Introduction 
In Dunlap's consolidated appeal, the SAPD raised four claims regarding jury 
instructions (#41105, R., pp.958-966), which this Court rejected under the capital 
fundamental error doctrine. Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 20-21. Dunlap now contends the 
SAPD was ineffective on appeal for failing to challenge three additional jury instructions. 
(Brief, pp.43-53.) However, like the four claims raised in the consolidated appeal, the 
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SAPD was not ineffective on appeal regarding the three new sub-claims because there 
was no objection below and they would have failed on appeal under Idaho's capital 
fundamental error doctrine. Because Dunlap has failed to overcome the presumption the 
SAPD winnowed out each of these sub-claims and failed to establish they would have 
changed the outcome of his appeal, each fails. 
2. Fundamental Error And Standards Of Law Regarding Jury Instructions 
Fundamental error as defined in State v. Perry, 150 P.3d 209, 245 P.3d 961, 980 
(2010), has been applied when the defendant fails to object to jury instructions. State v. 
Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 493, 259 P.3d 629 (Ct. App. 2011). Likewise, the fundamental 
error doctrine has been applied in capital cases, Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 210-21, which 
requires Dunlap to establish the existence of an error that was not harmless, id. at 19. 
An erroneous instruction rises to the level of a constitutional violation only where 
"there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a 
way that violates the Constitution." Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 390 (1999) 
(internal quotes and citation omitted). An instruction that reduces the state's burden of 
proof, for example, violates the right to a jury trial, because such an error would "vitiate[] 
all the jury's factual findings." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). 
Likewise, removing from the jury a decision on elements of the crime can implicate the 
constitutional right to a jury. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952). 
However, instructions must be reviewed "as a whole, not individually, to determine 
whether the jury was properly and adequately instructed." State v. Shackelford, 150 
Idaho 355, 247 P.3d 582, 373-74 (2010). "In evaluating the instructions, we do not 
engage in a technical parsing of [the] language of the instructions, but instead approach 
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the instructions in the same way that the jury would - with a commonsense understanding 
of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial." Johnson v. Texas, 
509 U.S. 350,367 (1993) (quotes and citation omitted). 
3. Failing To Appeal Preliminary Instruction P-3 
Dunlap contends Preliminary Instruction P-3, ~ 16, violated his right to due 
process because it "overly emphasized the need to exclude jurors who were inclined 
toward rendering a life verdict unless they could follow the law as given in the 
instructions" while it "ignored the same requirement that jurors who are inclined to 
render a death verdict had to follow the law as given," which, "in combination with the 
limited time for voir dire to explore individual views on the death penalty, led to the 
seating of jurors who were substantially impaired in their ability to follow the 
instructions." (Brief, p.43.) Because this Court has already affirmed the district court's 
limitations on voir dire, Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 19-20, and because Dunlap's claim is 
expressly tied to that limitation, his claim fails. However, even in isolation, the claim 
regarding this instruction fails. 6 
After the district court completed its questioning of the veniremen (#41105, R., 
1613-72), the court instructed the jury as follows: 
Because your verdict could lead to imposition of the death penalty, your 
attitude toward the death penalty is a proper subject of inquiry by the 
Court and the attorney[ s]. The fact that you may have reservations about 
or conscientious or religious objections to capital punishment, does not 
automatically disqualify you as a juror in a capital case. Of primary 
importance is whether you can subordinate your personal philosophy to 
your duty to abide by your oath as a juror and follow the law I give to you. 
If you are willing to render a verdict that speaks the truth as you find it to 
6 To the extent Dunlap's claim is premised upon Witherspoon and its progeny, in the 
previous section the state has addressed why there are no such violations. 
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exist, even though such verdict may lead to the imposition of the death 
penalty, you are qualified to serve as a juror in this case. If[,] however, 
you possess such strong opinions regarding capital punishment, no matter 
what the opinions may be, that you would be prevented or substantially 
impaired in the performance of your duties as a juror, you are not qualified 
to serve as a juror. 
It is up to each of you, using the standard described[,] to search 
your conscience to determine whether you are in a position to follow the 
law as I give it to you and render a verdict as the evidence warrants. Only 
by your candor can either the accused or the State of Idaho be assured of 
having this extremely serious case resolved by a fair and impartial juror. 
You will be asked questions by the Court and counsel in private 
regarding the death penalty and other issues. 
(Id., pp.1672-73 .) 
Dunlap's claim regarding this "instruction" misses the mark. The district court 
expressly stated the "primary importance is whether you can subordinate your personal 
philosophy to your duty to abide by your oath as a juror and follow the. law I give to 
you." (Id., p.1672.) The court further explained, "If, however, you possess such strong 
opinions regarding capital punishment, no matter what those opinions may be, that you 
would be prevented from or substantially impaired in the performance of your duties as a 
juror, you are not qualified to serve as ajuror." (Id., pp.1672-73) (emphasis added). The 
court was not inquiring or even focusing upon the need to exclude veniremen "inclined 
toward rendering a life verdict unless they could follow the law" (Brief, p.43), but was 
concerned with any "strong opinions regarding capital punishment" that would result in a 
venireman being "prevented from or substantially impaired in the performance of [their] 
duties as a juror." 
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Moreover, Dunlap completely ignores the written questionnaire completed by 
each venireman that asked multiple questions about their respective views regarding the 
death penalty (e.g., #41105, R., pp.1814-41), including the following: 
Under Idaho law, the jury has to decide whether to impose the death 
penalty. Persons convicted of First Degree Murder cannot automatically 
be given the death penalty. Before the jury could impose the death 
penalty, there will be a hearing on the appropriate penalty, and the jury 
would have to find that the death penalty was appropriate under the 
guidelines set by Idaho law. Evidence will be presented regarding the 
appropriate penalty. 
(Id., p.18) (emphasis in original). The veniremen were also asked, "Do you feel that your 
views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair your ability to view the 
facts impartially" and to explain "why." (Id.) 
Even if Preliminary Instruction P-3, ,i 16 did not adequately address the issue 
Dunlap is raising, when bolstered by the questionnaire and the questions of the respective 
attorneys during individual voir dire, he has failed to establish a Witherspoon or Morgan 
violation that should have been raised on appeal. Rather, he has "parsed" the language of 
the instruction and failed to view the instructions as a whole as required to establish 
instructional error, which not only demolishes the merits of his claim, but makes it 
virtually impossible for him to establish the error was not harmless. More importantly, 
he has failed to overcome the presumption that the SAPD made a tactical decision to not 
raise this issue for the first time on appeal. Dunlap implicitly concedes he raised a voir 
dire claim on appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court, but then contends, "Attacking 
Preliminary Instruction P-3 would have strengthened appellate counsel's claim regarding 
the inadequacies of individual voir dire." (Brief, p.46.) However, he fails to explain how 
such an attack would have strengthened the voir dire claim actually raised on appeal. 
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Dunlap's argument is nothing more than second-guessing the SAPD's arguments 
on appeal, which is not permitted under any kind of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, let alone ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Merely because Dunlap's 
current successive post-conviction attorneys would have raised a different voir dire claim 
or argued the claim that was raised differently, does not establish the SAPD was 
ineffective on appeal. Dunlap has completely failed to establish prejudice. 
4. Failing To Appeal The Propensity Instruction 
Despite conceding this Court has previously approved the narrowing language for 
the propensity aggravator, Dunlap contends he "raises this issue to preserve it for review" 
and that the SAPD was ineffective for not raising it on direct appeal because the phrase, 
"less than the normal amount of provocation," is allegedly "undefined, ambiguous and 
confusing." (Brief, pp.46-47.) Not only has Dunlap failed to establish the SAPD's 
performance was deficient, he has failed to establish prejudice. 
The propensity aggravator reads, "The defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in 
the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder 
which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society." LC. § l 9-25 l 5(9)(h). Not 
only was this statutory aggravating factor given to the jury (#32773, Supp. R., p.13), but 
the district court also gave the approved narrowing instruction regarding the aggravator, 
which reads as follows: 
The phrase "exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will 
probably constitute a continuing threat to society" means conduct showing 
that the defendant is more likely than not to be a continuing threat to 
society. The state is required to prove the existence of this propensity 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Such finding cannot be based solely upon the 
fact that you found the defendant guilty of murder. In order for a person 
to have a propensity to commit murder, the person must be a willing, 
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predisposed killer, a killer who tends toward destroying the life of another, 
one who kills with less than the normal amount of provocation. 
Propensity requires a proclivity, a susceptibility, and even an affinity 
toward committing the act of murder. 
(Id., p.17.) 
This language was derived from this Court narrowing the class of people eligible 
for the death penalty in State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 380-81, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), as 
follows: 
We would construe "propensity" to exclude, for example, a person who 
has no inclination to kill but in an episode of rage, such as during an 
emotional family or lover's quarrel, commits the offense of murder. We 
would doubt that most of those convicted of murder would again commit 
murder, and rather we construe the "propensity" language to specify that 
person who is a willing, predisposed killer, a killer who tends toward 
destroying the life of another, one who kills with less than the normal 
amount of provocation. We would hold that propensity assumes a 
proclivity, susceptibility, and even an affinity toward committing the act 
of murder. 
In State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 711, 810 P.2d 680 (1991), this Court 
recognized similar language was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and concluded there was "no reason to reconsider our 
opinions." Moreover, the United States District Court of Idaho has reasoned the 
narrowing language from Creech "is sufficiently narrow to channel the sentencer's 
discretion to focus on the future dangerousness of the offender based on objective facts." 
Creech v. Hardison, 2010 WL 1338126, *21 (D. Idaho 2010). 
Because this Court provided the narrowing language for Instruction 11, which is a 
pattern jury instruction in Idaho (ICJI #1715) and instructions approved by the Idaho 
Supreme Court are "presumptively correct," McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 225 
P.3d 700 (2010), and because the instruction has been approved by a federal district 
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court, not only has Dunlap failed to establish the SAPD ignored an issue that should have 
been raised on appeal because it was a "dead bang winner" that was "obvious from the 
trial record," Cook, 45 F.3d at 395, this claim was a "dead bang loser" with no possibility 
of success on appeal before this Court. Merely because Dunlap now wishes to "preserve" 
the claim for review before some other court, does not mean the SAPD's performance 
was deficient. Indeed, "[a] criminal defendant does not have the right to have this Court 
review an opinion of the Court of Appeals," Pierce v. State, 142 Idaho 32, 34, 121 P.3d 
963 (2005), let alone the right to preserve an issue for some other unknown court. 
Interestingly, when Sivak v. Hardison, 2008 WL 782877, *25 (D. Idaho 2008), 
was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, the issue of whether the limiting language of the 
propensity aggravator is unconstitutionally vague was not raised on appeal even though 
Sivak was represented by the same attorneys representing Dunlap in the instant case. See 
Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011). Presumably, Dunlap's current attorneys 
made a tactical decision in Sivak to winnow out the claim on appeal because it had 
virtually no possibility of success. The SAPD should be afforded that same discretion, 
particularly since Dunlap is parsing a single clause from the instruction and failing to 
recognize the instruction must be read as a whole. See Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367 ("In 
evaluating the instructions, we do not engage in a technical parsing of this language of 
the instructions, but instead approach the instructions in the same way that the jury would 
- with a commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken 
place at the trial."); State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 363, 690 P.2d 293 (1984) ("Jury 
instructions must be read in their entirety, as a whole, not in their isolated parts."). 
50 
Moreover, even if the instruction was erroneous, there was no prejudice because 
the jury found two other statutory aggravating factors and weighed the collective 
mitigation against the statutory aggravating factors individually. (R., #32773, pp.686-
88.) Therefore, this Court would not need to address Instruction 11, and even if it was 
addressed, the death penalty would have been affirmed. See State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 
88, 105-06, 967 P.2d 702 (1998); Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 541-42 (9th Cir. 2001) 
( declining to address the constitutionality of the "heinous, atrocious and cruel" 
aggravating factor because, under LC. §19-2515, the trial court correctly weighed the 
collective mitigation against another statutory aggravating factor). 7 
Dunlap has failed to overcome the presumption that failing to raise this issue on 
appeal was strategic or otherwise establish deficient performance or prejudice. 
5. Failing To Appeal Instruction 14 And The Verdict Form 
Dunlap contends the SAPD was ineffective on appeal by failing to raise another 
claim regarding Instruction 14 and the verdict form, asserting they "improperly instructed 
the jury on the sentencing law, I.C. § 19-2515, that applied at the time of the re-
resentencing proceeding, rather than the law that applied at the time of the crime and 
entry of [his] guilty plea," which allegedly "violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process 
Clauses of the state and federal constitutions." (Brief, p.49.) This claim fails because 
7 The state recognizes this Court· subsequently determined the jury was not properly 
instructed regarding the specific intent aggravator. Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 20-21. 
However, the SAPD had no way of knowing when winnowing out claims that this Court 
would find instructional error regarding the specific intent aggravator. Therefore, the 
SAPD's performance was not deficient. Irrespective, because there are still two statutory 
aggravators, any alleged error was harmless. Id. at 21. Moreover, there was no prejudice 
because Dunlap has failed to establish the results of his direct appeal with respect to this 
issue would have changed since it fails on its merits. 
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Dunlap has failed to overcome the presumption that the SAPD appropriately winnowed 
out this claim because it fails on the merits. 
In his first resentencing post-conviction case, Dunlap raised a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel based upon resentencing counsels' "failing to request or argue that 
the court apply the version of LC.§ 19-2515 in effect at the time of Mr. Dunlap's offense 
and entry of guilty plea as it related to the finding and weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances." (#37270, R., p.923.) While the claim was not couched in 
terms of Instruction 14 and the verdict form, both were referenced (id.) and it was similar 
to the claim Dunlap raised in his successive Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
(compare #41105, R., pp.1566-68). Moreover, the SAPD actually raised a claim based 
upon Instruction 14 in Dunlap's consolidated direct appeal (id., pp.962-63), which this 
Court summarily rejected, Dunlap V, 313 P.3d at 21. Obviously, the SAPD was aware of 
this claim when the opening brief was filed with this Court, recognized its futility, and 
simply chose to raise stronger arguments on appeal. 
Dunlap has also failed to establish prejudice because the claim fails on its merits. 
At the time Dunlap murdered Tonya in 1991, the relevant portion of LC. § 19-2515(c) 
(1991), read as follows: 
Where a person is convicted of an offense which may be 
punishable by death, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the 
court finds at least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance. Where the 
court finds a statutory aggravating circumstance the court shall sentence 
the defendant to death unless the court finds that mitigating circumstances 
which may be presented outweigh the gravity of any aggravating 
circumstance found and make imposition of death unjust. 
In 2006, the relevant portion of LC.§ 19-2515(3) was amended as follows: 
Where a person is convicted of an offense which may be 
punishable by death, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless: 
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(b) The jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds 
beyond a reasonable· doubt at least one (1) statutory 
aggravating circumstance. Where a statutory aggravating 
circumstance is found, the defendant shall be sentenced to 
death unless mitigating circumstances which may be 
presented are found to be sufficiently compelling that the 
death penalty would be unjust. The jury shall not direct 
imposition of a sentence of death unless it unanimously 
determines that the penalty of death should be imposed. 
LC.§ 19-2515(3) (2006). 
Dunlap contends .the change from, "unless the court finds that mitigating 
circumstances which may be presented outweigh the gravity of any aggravating 
circumstance found and make imposition of death unjust," to "unless mitigating 
circumstances which may be presented are found to be sufficiently compelling that the 
death penalty would be unjust," unconstitutionally reduced the state's burden of proof, 
thereby resulting in an expostfacto violation. (Brief, pp.49-51.) 
The United States Constitution, article I, § 10, prohibits the enactment of ex post 
facto laws. As explained in State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 166, 627 P.2d 788 (1981) 
(quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)), the United States Supreme 
Court has defined what constitutes an ex post facto violation as follows: 
15\ every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and 
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. 
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when 
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 
4th • Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of 
the offense, in order to convict the offender. 
Dunlap's claim is based upon the fourth category and the contention that the 
amendment, "unless mitigating circumstances which may be presented are found to be 
sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust," is a more lenient standard 
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than whether the mitigating circumstances "outweigh the gravity of any aggravating 
circumstances found and make imposition of death unjust." (Brief, pp.49-53.) However, 
the challenged language does not change the burden of proof. Rather, the question under 
both phrases is whether the mitigation makes imposition of the death penalty unjust. In 
other words, the question is not the quantum of mitigation, i.e., whether the mitigation 
"outweigh[ s ]" the aggravating circumstance or the mitigation is "sufficiently 
compelling," but whether the mitigation makes the death penalty unjust. 
Nevertheless, assuming the state has the burden of establishing the mitigation 
does not make imposition of the death penalty unjust and that the amendment somehow 
changed that burden, the amendment actually increased the state's burden. As recognized 
by the district court (#41105, R., pp.2275-77), under the prior statute the state had the 
burden of establishing the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh any aggravating 
circumstance thereby making imposition of the death penalty unjust. Under the new 
statute, the state has the burden of establishing the mitigating circumstances are not 
sufficiently compelling to make imposition of the death penalty unjust. Under Dunlap's 
analysis, the amendment increases the state's burden by requiring the state to disprove the 
mitigating circumstances are not sufficiently compelling, while previously the state was 
merely required to establish they did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 
Further, as recognized by the district court (id., pp.2277-78), this Court has 
already determined the changes made to LC.§ 19-2515 are substantive in nature. In State 
v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 77-78, 90 P.3d 298 (2004), this Court addressed the changes 
in LC. § 19-2515 and concluded they are merely procedural changes that are not subject 
to the Ex Post Facto Clause. As explained in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 
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(1977) (internal quotes and citations omitted) ( emphasis added), the Ex Post Facto 
Clause generally does not apply to procedural matters: 
It is equally well settled, however, that the inhibition upon the 
passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in 
all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed. 
The constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal 
rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, and not to limit the 
legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not 
affect matters of substance. 
Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a 
procedural change is not ex post facto. 
Because the changes to LC. § 19-2515 are procedural in nature, do not change the 
burden, and if they do change the burden actually increase it for the state, Dunlap has 
failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice as a result of the SAPD's 
tactical decision to winnow this claim on direct appeal. 
Dunlap has failed to establish any error in the summary dismissal of his 
successive Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order summarily dismissing Dunlap's successive Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief be affirmed. 
DA TED this 9th day of July, 2014. 
~-~ 
L.LaMO~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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